INTRODUCTION Historical Background of the Issue
The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), which is usually considered as the Arab region, characterized by civil war, revolutions, and undemocratic powerful authoritarian regimes. The 44 th President of the USA, Barack Obama, once mentioned in his remarks on the MENA that these countries won their independence a long time ago, but the people did not (2011) . Until the end of the first decade of twenty first century, despite several home works left to be done on sphere of democracy and economy, the large Arab region seemed politically stable, with its decades-long authoritarian regimes firmly holding onto their power, and politically silenced populations striving to live with widespread economic and political malaises.
Everything was changed on December 17, 2010, when a policewoman confiscated the unlicensed Conflicts are occurring at the local, national, and even regional levels'' (Engel, 2014:1) . Hence, in a dissimilar way to postrevolution situation in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya experienced unintended outcome which turn the state in to instability.
This paper gives emphasis to Libya that relapsed into instability after the revolution and is going to be considered another 'Somalia' in the North Africa. A few days after the death of Gaddafi Libya immersed in to social, political and economic crisis that have been continuing, and the state became a hub of terrorist groups and illicit traffickers in the region. Different groups exercise power over the state. Of which, the major four that are currently in control of Libya Lastly, investigating the basic internal and external factors for Libyan entry in to crisis after the revolution indepth, the paper has provided the way out for Libya.
Libya
Libya is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the North, Egypt to the East, Sudan to the South-East, Chad and
Niger to the South, and Algeria and Tunisia to the West. With an area of almost 1,800,000 square kilometers, Libya considered as large country in Africa. However, the Sahara desert covers more than 95 percent of the country, and therefore most of it is uninhabitable; more than 90 percent of Libya's six million people live along the Mediterranean coast (CIA, 2011). (Garland, 2012) . The response from
Gaddafi was quick and brutal.
On February 27, 2011, after ten days of seemingly disorganized protests, the formation of a National Transitional Council (hereinafter NTC) is announced, headed by former minister of Justice, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who in the preceding week defected from the government in protest over the level of violence used against the protesters.
The protest turned in to a full scale civil war and saw the involvement of international Community after a month.
The civil war come to its end almost after eight months of massacres, fights, battles, revolution and conflict when a former Libyan leader Gaddafi was captured while sheltering in a drainage pipe and just in matter of minutes shot to death by
Misratan militia-men outside the city of Sirte on October 20, 2011.
Consequence:
The revolution removed Gaddafi's rule. This was accomplished with a heavy price. Different bodies forwarded different numbers of deaths and injuries during the revolution, but the majority agreed that at least 30,000 people were killed and 50,000 people wounded as the result of the revolution (Chivvies and Martini, 2014) .
Despite initial signs that shows Libya might move toward stability, the country has teetered on the brink of failure with the total collapse of the transition after Gaddafi. The followed socio-economic and political instability in Libya affected not only socio-economic and politics of the state, but it also imposed security, economy and political crisis on North Africa.
Major Political Developments in Libya From 2011-2016
Lack of control on violence within the borders or control of populations and territory as well as not providing a range of public goods are what the attributes of failed states are. Deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring faction that lack both domestic and international legitimacy are also their others attributes. The sense of optimism, however, was soon darkened by the cloud cast of continuing violence and instability due to the inability of NTC and GNC to controlarms proliferation and disarm armed gangs and militias. Numerous militias, sub-state groups, and local and military councils asserted peripheral power, bringing into play legitimacy of arms at the expense of the ruling government. The interim governments failed to apply Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (hereinafter DDR) program. The GNCs attempt to incorporate estimated 250,000 militias to the army also failed (Varvelli, 2013) . Militias raid institutions symbolizing the state, such as prisons and hospitals, and blockaded government ministries and offices; they even killed and kidnapped whoever they wanted. On September 11, 2012 the U. S.
Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens and three other Americans were killed in Benghazi by jihadists (Pedersen, 2013) . . PIL isan act that bans former Gaddafi officials from holding public office or serving in high-level positions in Libyan state institutions for ten years. This is planned byIslamist politicians who were unable to advance their agenda in the GNC due to the majority nature of the secular National Force Alliance and its allies.
The law would prevent members of the current government such as Mohamed Magarief, president of the GNC, and Ali Zeidan, the Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Jibril, current leader of the National Forces Alliance (Pedersen, 2013 law affects minimum of 500,000 workers directly and 2.5 million people indirectly as averagely five member of a family rely on the income of one person in Libya (Gaub, 2015) . Besides, creating the culture of vengeance, their expertise and knowledge of the running of government affects the already paralyzed and weak government.
Amid of growing institutional and security chaos the retired army General KhalifaHaftar appeared on television and call for suspension of the government and the removal of the islamist dominated GNC on 14 February 2014 (Toaldo, 2015) . In the meantime, the GNC was dissolved and election for the GNC's successor, a House of Representatives (hereinafter HoR), held on June 25, 2014 . This election was not only the result of pressure from Operation Dignity, but also public discontent largely directed at the GNC due to security erosion, state's inability to provide basic services to the people, widespread corruption and most importantly the rumor that the parliament is to apply Sheria. Smugglers, like terrorists, are using Libya as a centre and destination for their different illicit trade activities from human trafficking to drug trafficking and from firearms to contraband smuggling. These region destabilizing activities became more complicating not only due to the porous nature of borders in the region, but also the active participation of terrorist groups in the trafficking to buy weapon with the income from it (GIATOC, 2015). 
WHY DID LIBYA FALL IN TO CRISIS AFTER GADDAFI?: ANALYSIS
The Centre is weak, while some peripheries are empowered in Libya. This current Libyan crisis is to a large extent the result of the essential struggle over political, military, institutional, or economic power and competing visions of the future of post-revolution Libya.
Most of the time, the current instability in the country is related with the 2011 popular revolution, and said to be the continuation of it. But there are also the pre and post revolution factors that turned the country into political, economic and social crisis.
Internal Factors

Legacies of the Gaddafi Regime
Post-revolution political, security as well as economic crisis of Libya which related with the weak institutional capacity, lack of democratic experience, mutual suspicion among tribes, and poor security personnel and institutions, nondiversified economy and absence of private ownership and others all have their roots in the previous government which centered only on the survival of the regime, not the 'State'.
During the reign of Gaddafi a favour based on allegiance and the marginalization of educated people for the sake of regime survival resulted in current Libya's lack of experienced and trained civil service to manage and administer governance. Gaddafi who claimed his regime was based on popular will (Jamahiriya) systematically suppressed civil society and independent media, prohibited the establishment of political parties, and created a web of unelected bodies and informal power structures. In an effort to maintain control, Gaddafi pursued a divide and rule policy, sowing the seeds of hostility and distrust by provoking community against community, tribe against tribe, andregion against region. Today Libya's regular army is a largely hollow force, keptextremely ill equipped, poorly trained, and deliberately weak and underfunded by Gaddafi who feared its potential for coups. Using hisfirst-hand experience with how a national army could threaten a regime, Gaddafi carefully andstrategically kept the role of the formal security institutions (the police and the national army) to a minimum. Police were tasked with civilian security functions but were structurally disempowered and ill-equipped. Leadershipwas also frequently rotated in order to prevent a professional ethic from developing. In his ideology of Jamahiriyaor 'mass-ocracy' Gaddafi attempted to create a stateless society in which ordinary citizens would be able to manage their own affairs without the intervention of state institutions. He therefore supported the creation of the 'People's Militias', in whichordinary men and women would be in charge of defending their own country.
The former minimum role of the army further eroded after failing in its interventions in Chad, in its efforts to prevent US bombardments in 1986 and attempted coups d'état between 1993 and 1995 (Martinez, 2014) .
Weaknesses of the NTC and GNC
NTC, a body which rule during the revolution and in the ten months that followed, was succeeded by the GNC, showed some 120,000 rebels in need of DDR, but within months that number had ballooned to more than 200,000, nearly 11 percent of the country's estimated workforce of 2.3 million" (Engel, 2014:5) .
Basically, it was understanding its necessity that Abdul Raheem Al-Keeb's interim government began to carryout DDR program of incorporating these fighting units within state institutions. According to the program, the large majority of the armed groups have been incorporated into two umbrella coalitions, the Libya Shield Force (LSF) and the Supreme Security Committees (SSC), which were established as transitional security forces . But problems soon occurred. The NTC had no reliable military forces from Libya or international organization to implement it. Then the government offered to rebel leaders to disarm or cooperate more actively. As registration started 148,000 youths registered.
Of these some needs to be integrated to regular armed forces; some to join the border police, some to be the oil guards, some civil-service jobs and the remaining wanted to start their own businesses (Chivvies and Martini, 2014) . The absence of strong bureaucracy to augment these and the difficulty of identifying these young whether they are veterans or not also further complicated the process. Again, militias incorporated also act with a high degree of autonomy. Some pursue This related with the TNCs idea of Group Integration. In relation to this, the transitional government also largely to blamed for the 'militiazation' of Libyan society, as it pursued a policy of subsidizing militias due to depends on militias to provide security (Samuels, 2014). Its strategy of funding and funneling militias into semi-state forces such as SSC (auxiliary police) and LSF (auxiliary army) has sown the seeds of 'warlordism' (Wehry, 2012 ).
Libya's borders were so long and porous. The NTC and GNC proved unable to exert even a small amount of control over the population and failed to protect Libya's territorial integrity."Since the post-revolution collapse of central authority, Libya's 2,500 miles of land borders and 1,250 miles of sea borders have remained porous or easily passable"
(Michel, 2014:3). As a result part of the state became a hub of terrorists and illegal traffickers.
NTC and GNC have less commitment to good governance. The lack of transparency on public spending, and corruption due to deliberate mismanagement of funds and also financial errors caused by an unsophisticated and disorganized administration brought doubt on their administration. Funds lost to corruption and poor administration.
"Libyan-Swiss banker and anticorruption crusader Abdul Hamid al-Jadi claimed that "if corruption was 100 percent
[before the revolution], then it is now 110 percent"" (Borzou, 2014: 6) . Neither the NTC nor the TNG has been effective in communicating plans, visions, or accomplishments to the public, and there was confusion over the responsibilities and authority of local councils.
NTC has been maintaining the pro-Arab status quo and not making sufficient efforts to include Libya's ethnic minorities like Toubou who were marginalized under Gaddafi. As was shown during the 2012 election barriers exist to full political participation: many ethnic minorities, who do not have citizenship cards or family books, cannot run for political office. That is why ethnic groups like Toubou refused to disarm (Tracey, 2012) .
NTC formerly promised to provide constitution to the people within a year after Gaddafi. Moving no tangible step forward it passed the task to GNC. GNC pass the electoral law that would enable elections of the drafting committee. After approval drafting committee were elected in the early 2014 (Chivvies and Martini, 2014) . With the broke out of the 2014 civil war their move was trapped.
Cleavages or Divisions in Libya
Libyans, triggered by common causes for common goal of removing an undemocratic Gaddafi regime and 
External Factors
Lack of External Assistance
NATOs intervention in Libya, as was described by NATOs secretary general Andres Fogh Rasmussen, was one of the most successful in its history. It was successful in several important respects; for example, toppling Muammar
Gaddafi's 42-year-old regime without the deployment of ground forces, with very low levels of collateral damage, and no
NATO casualties. This alliance ended its warfare in Libya on 30 October at 11:59 PM (Borghard and Pischedda, 2012).
Despite its positive side in defending the civilians from Gaddafi's attacks, the alliance has been going out of its allowing the Libyan Air Force to accept delivery of at least four Russian Sukhoi Su-30 long-range multirole combat aircraft via Egypt; and lifting the embargo on arms sales to Libya to the benefit of the Tobruk government, insisting on the need to build the capacity of Libya's national army to combat terrorism, Egypt was supporting the Tobruk government (Reeve, 2015) . Ignoring peaceful resolution, Egypt's military action was a signal to the main belligerents competing for political power that the current crisis could be addressed by military means. Relying on the finding of the work, the author has recommended the following points as the way out for Libya.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• The UN in cooperation with other international stakeholders, like the AU, Arab League, and EU, should review the makeup and power of the new UN backed Libyan government, and make power divisions fair so that all factions can be satisfied.
• The new Government of National Accord with the help of the UN and others should recruit armies or militias and send them without delay to fight, stop and even retake territory from ISIS until unified national-level security institutions can be established.
The Medium and Long Term Actions for Sustainable Peace and Stability
• The new Libyan government should start a state re-building process in a democratic way with advice from the UN and AU, modifying if not the wholesale repealing of the Political Isolation Law (PIL).
• The new Libyan government should carefully re-apply the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation program with the help of the people, the UN, and other stake holders.
• The new Libyan government should form a new mixed national military force focusing on their performance, status and above all geographical representation.
• T he government that would assume power after the general election should rule treating the three regions fairly and equally.
